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Buried deep in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 is another in a lengthen-
ing series of provisions aimed at providing better low and moderate
income housing in the United States. Section 167(k) of the Internal
Revenue Code is an accelerated depreciation provision which allows
investors to write off rehabilitation expenditures over a sixty-month
period.1 Because other changes in depreciation rules within the Reform
Act make real estate ventures less useful as tax shelters,2 Section 167(k)
1. The full text of Section 167(k) is as follows:
(k) DEPRECIATION OF EXPENDITURES TO REHABILITATE LOW-INCOME
RENTAL HOUSING.-
(1) 60-MONTH RULE-The taxpayer may elect, in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, to compute the depredation deduction
provided by subsection (a) attributable to rehabilitation expenditures incurred with
respect to low-income rental housing after July 24, 1969, and before January 1, 1975,
under the straight line method using a useful life of 60 months and no salvage .-aluc.
Such method shall be in lieu of any other method of computing the depredation
deduction under subsection (a), and in lieu of any deduction for amortization, for
such expenditures.
(2) LIMITATIONS.-
(A) The aggregate amount of rehabilitation expenditures paid or incurred by the
taxpayer with respect to any dwelling unit in any low-income rental housing which
may be taken into account under paragraph (1) shall not exceed $15,000.
(B) Rehabilitation expenditures paid or incurred by the taxpayer in any taxable
year with respect to any dwelling unit in any low-income rental housing shall be
taken into account under paragraph (1) only if over a period of two consecutive
years, including the taxable year, the aggregate amount of such expenditures exceeds
$3,000.
(3) DEFINITIONS--For purpose of this subsection-
(A) REHABILITATION EXPENDITURES.-The term 'rehabilitation expendi-
tures' means amounts chargeable to capital account and incurred for property or
additions or improvements to property (or related facilities) with a useful life of 5
years or more, in connection with the rehabilitation of an existing building for low-
income rental housing; but such term does not include the cost of acquisition of
such building or any interest therein.
(B) LOW-INCOME RENTAL HOUSING.-The term 'low-income rental hous-
ing' means any building the dwelling units in which are held for occupancy on a
rental basis by families and individuals of low or moderate income, as determined
by the Secretary or his delegate in a manner consistent with the polides of the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 pursuant to regulations prescribed
under this subsection.
(C) DWELLING UNIT.-The term 'dwelling unit' means a house or an apart-
ment used to provide living accomodations in a building or structure, but does not
include a unit in a hotel, motel, inn, or other establishment more than one-half of
the units in which are used on a transient basis.
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 521(a), 83 Stat. 651 (1969).
2. The Tax Reform Act makes a number of important changes in the tax treatment
of Section 1250 property. Depreciation on new non-residential property is restricted to
a method which will not produce an allowance in the first two-thirds of the propertys
estimated useful life in excess of the amount that would be produced by the use of the
150 per cent declining balance method. Used residential property with a useful life of
twenty years or more may be depreciated by a 125 per cent dedlining balance method.
All other used real property is limited to straight line depredation.
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should attract the attention of tax-conscious investors. But unless the
section is administered with an understanding of the market forces
which will influence its operation, it will fail to realize its fullest poten-
tial contribution to the satisfaction of the nation's pressing housing
needs.
Despite its inobtrusive placement in the midst of more controversial
changes in the tax law,3 the housing assistance program created by
Section 167(k) is noteworthy as the first major housing program to
utilize tax incentives,4 as the first major housing program to concentrate
on rehabilitation,5 and as a program whose great potential cost rivals
All new Section 1250 property, including rehabilitated housing qualified for fast de-
predation under Section 167(k), is subject to strict recapture provisions. Nonhousing
property is denied the one per cent per month phase out of recapture. Residential prop-
erty is permitted to begin the phase out only after it has been held for 100 months. Id.
The changes in the recapture rules are not to apply in the case of federally assisted
projects (such as FHA Section 221(d)(3), see note 38 infra, and 236, see note 37 infra,
programs) or other publicly assisted housing programs under which the return to the
investor is limited on a comparable basis. These programs have in reality depended
heavily on tax benefits, see, e.g., THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIrrEn ON URBAN
HoUsING, A DECENT HOME 82-84, 238-39 (1968). [hereinafter cited as A DENT l-OmL].
For a numerical comparison of depredation allowances produced by various methods
see L. WVINNICK, MENTAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT 148-49 (1958);
see also U.S. NAT'L CoMAnL. ON URBAN PROBLEMS, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX IN RELATION
TO HOUSING Table 3, at 46 (1968) [hereinafter cited as THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX]; Sun-
ley, The Present Value of Depreciation Allowances, 9 Q. REv. oF ECON. SL- Bus, 77-79
(1969).
3. The predominant issues were taxation of foundations, reduction of the percentage
depletion allowance, and alleviation of the tax burden imposed on low income families.
See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. 6968-7018 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1969); (debate on H.R. 13270 by
the House and a Committee of the whole) id. at 7073-7151 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1969) (similar
discussion).
4. But of course nearly all housing assistance programs have depended upon the tax
shelter principle inherent in depredation provisions. See, e.g., A DECENT HOME 83, 238-89.
5. With a few relatively small exceptions, see note 6 infra, earlier programs empha-
sized new construction, in part on the "trickle down" theory, and in part on the theory
that new construction would add to the total standing stock of housing while rehablilta-
tion would not. Even as recently as 1968, Congress carefully restricted the Section 235
homeownership program (see notes 36 & 37 inlra) by limiting its applicability to rehabil-
itation of existing dwellings: only 25% of the first year's contracts, 15% of the next year's,
and 10% of the third year's could be used for rehabilitation of existing housing. But re-
cently Congress has indicated that rehabilitation should be further encouraged by in.
creasing these percentages, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, P.L, 91-152,
§ 109, 83 STAT. 381 (1969).
Rehabilitation should be less expensive than new construction, assuming equal durabil-
ity. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has estimated that under Sec.
tion 236 of the National Housing Act the average cost of an equivalent rehabilitated
unit wil be only $11,300. Hearings on Housing and Urban Development Legislation of
1968 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Sen. Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1320, 1349 (1968). See also Hearings on Housing
Legislation of 1967 Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 12-13, 95-111 (testimony of Sec'y Weaver); A DECENT HoMiE 101; Schuster, Rehabilita.
tion: A Matter of Time and Money, 33 J. PROP. MCNIT. 251 (1968).
In addition to saving in direct construction costs, rehabilitation should require less
sacrifice of tax revenues derived by local governments from real property taxes. Programs
which require demolition and clearance frequently involve the removal of taxable prop-
erty for considerable periods of time. See Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer in URBAN
RENmVAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 498-99 (J. Wilson ed. 1966).
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that of previous direct expenditure programs.0 But unlike the long,
complex, and detailed statutes which have created direct expenditure
programs of similar magnitude,7 Section 167(k) is brief and categorical.
There are three central requirements for receiving benefits under the
section: (1) expenditures must be for rehabilitation; (2) rehabilitated
dwellings must be held for rental to low and moderate income tenants;
(3) depreciable rehabilitation expenditures must aggregate, within
two consecutive years," between $3,000 and $15,0000 per unit. The
The fact that rehabilitation is generally recognized to be less expensive than new con-
struction of low rent units (see, e.g., A DECENT Ho.Ni 108-10) tends to dispel fears that
the unique nature of each rehabilitation project makes the technique unsuitable for pro-
viding housing. Moreover, if inefficiendes are built into the HUD estimates, experience
acquired through utilization of Section 167(k) could lead to their elimination and to en-
largement of cost advantages now ascribed to rehabilitation. See Hearings on S.1354 Be.
fore the Subcomm. on Housing of the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 282, 285 (1965).
6. The House and Senate reports on H.R. 13270 estimate that $15 million of tax rev-
enue will be lost in the first year of operation and that in 1974 $200 million will be lost
as a consequence of Section 167(k). If the program is continued, it will result in a rev-
enue loss of $330 million in 1979. H.R. REP. No. 413 (Pt. 1), 91st Cong., 2d Ses. 16 (1969).
The estimate must be subject to considerable variability, see TAN 16-18 infra.
Other rehabilitation programs have involved relatively insignificant amounts. Rehabil-
itation grants under Section 115 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965,
42 U.S.C. § 1466 (Supp. III 1967), had totalled $6.3 million as of Dec. 31, 1267. At the
same date section 312 loans, 42 U.S.C. § 1452(b) (Supp. IMI 1907), totalling $14.1 million
had been extended to finance rehabilitation in federally aided urban renewal and con-
centrated code enforcement areas. U.S. DEPr. OF HousING & Up.mi DEE.Lo, .Ni'r I-IUD Zd
ANNUAL REP'ORr 27 (1967). The Section 221(h) program-for the purchase and rehabilita.
tion of housing by nonprofit organizations for resale to low income purchasrs-had
insured below market interest rate mortgages on 73 projects totalling about $7 million.
Id. at 19.
Under Section 221(d)(3), the largest housing program for low and moderate income
families, the FRA insured over $1 billion in below market interest rate mortgages during
the six year period from 1961 to 1967, an average of almost $200 million per year. Id.
Authorizations for Sections 235 and 236 have been large, but only relatively small amounts
have been appropriated. Both of these programs can be used for rehabilitation, although
they are directed primarily toward the production of new housing.
7. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1415 (1937) (public housing); 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (Supp. III
1967) (moderate income rental and homeownership). The rehabilitation programs have
not been so long and detailed, but they have been strictly limited in scope. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1452(b) (Supp. III 1967) (rehabilitation loans for urban renewal areas); 412 U.S.C. § 1466
(Supp. MI 1967) (rehabilitation grant program).
8. Since many single rehabilitation projects which span more than one calendar )ear
might oterwise be denied Section 167(k) treatment when less than $3,000 is spent in
each year, the statute allows consolidation of consecutive years. It may also he possible
to use the two year provision to obtain Section 167(k) treatment for separate rehabilita-
tion items done in consecutive years which would not otherwise meet the minimum ex.
penditure requirement.
The section is restricted to capital expenditures. Since other expenditures are currently
deductible, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a), this restriction is self-poicing.
9. Since there is no indication in either the bill itself or the accompanying House
Report that Section 167(k) is designed only to subsidize substantial rehabilitation, the
purpose of the $3,000 threshold is probably to avoid the expenses of administration in
cases where the subsidy is unlikely to be exceeded by administrative costs. The threshold
technique was used throughout the House bill. See, e.g., H.R. 13270, §§ 211, 221, 302,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
It has been suggested, however, that the first small increment of money spent on reha-
bilitation may be more important to the restoration of habitability than further expen.
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third of these requirements is but a qualification of the first. Funda-
mentally, there are two requirements for Section 167(k) treatment:
expenditures must be for rehabilitation, and the rehabilitated units
must be held for rental to low and moderate income families.
If only the requirement of rehabilitation were present, the scope and
impact of the housing program created by Section 167(k) would be
subject to considerable uncertainty. The word "rehabilitation" is of
uncertain meaning and cannot easily be distinguished from renovation,
remodeling, redecorating, and even some kinds of maintenance. Many
improvements-ranging from those which raise seriously defective
housing to a modest but decent level to those that add luxuries to
sound housing-could conceivably qualify. Although "rehabilitation"
may imply a prior condition of deterioration or dilapidation, thus
limiting Section 167(k) to improvements of dwellings which have
fallen below some minimal standard, the section articulates no such
standard. While the urgent national concern for urban problems may
indicate that Congress was concerned with encouraging non-luxury
improvements, the legislative history of Section 167(k) is sparse. The
report accompanying H.R. 18270, which describes in fair detail the
legislative objectives of most Reform Act changes, limits itself to the
simple statement that "[y]our committee bill also recognizes the im-
portance of rehabilitation of buildings for low-cost rental housing."1
Nothing can safely be concluded from that oracular statement of legis.
lative intent, and there are no other references to the provision-even
in the hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee,12 which
ditures. See generally Quirk & Wein, Home-ownership for the Poor: Tenant Conlomin-
iums, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, and The Rockefeller Program,
54 Co Eu.L . REv. 811, 826 (1969) (suggesting that a program of minimal rehabilitation
might be preferable to a program of substantial rehabilitation).
10. The $15,000 maximum is designed to prevent very expensive "Georgetown" re-
habilitation, according to the Treasury's interpretation. Letter from John S. Nolan, Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, dated Feb. 2, 1970, on file at the Yale Law
Journal. But luxury improvements are not precluded by the $15,000 limit, and could of-
ten qualify in the absence of a restriction to families of low and moderate income, see
TAN 32 infra.
11. H.R. RE,. No. 413, supra note 6, at 167.
12. Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on the Tax Reform
Bill of 1969 (H.R. 13270), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8 (1969).
Several witnesses did refer to the possibility of tax incentives for rehabilitation of low
cost housing. See, e.g., Testimony of Jason R. Nathan, Administrator, Housing and De.
velopment Administration, City of New York, in support of tax incentives as a policy to
alleviate urban ills, id. at 2809-10. Jerard M. Gross of the National Apartment Ass'n test-
fled in favor of Rep. Boggs' bill, H.R. 3658, which would have allowed rehabilitatlon
expenditures to be deducted currently, id. at 2748-70. Robert H. Pease of the Mortgage
Bankers Ass'n of America suggested that accelerated depredation for rehabilitation ex-
penditures is absolutely essential, id. at 2770, 2773-79. But no testimony directed to the
form of allowance embodied in Section 167(k) was adduced.
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first suggested the program.13 The rehabilitation requirement appears
to provide inadequate guidance for formulating the Section 167(k)
program.
The most critical decision in the administration of Section 167(k)
will therefore involve the second of its definitional requirements-
establishing the maximum income level 4 allowed for tenants of
eligible dwelling units, a task which the section assigns to the Secretary
of the Treasury.15 The income ceiling will determine the total amount
of lost taxes resulting from the program (i.e., the aggregate amount of
government subsidy), the income level of those whom it directly bene-
fits, and the nature of the housing improvements which it encourages.
Because the cost of rehabilitation, reduced by the amount of tax
remissions, must be passed on to eligible tenants, the ceiling will affect
the willingness of private investors to take advantage of the
programs, and thus the resources diverted into it. Establishing too low
a level of income eligibility could render the program wholly ineffec-
tive. Were eligible tenants restricted to those of lowest income,'0 few
could afford the substantially increased rentals which would result from
1. The legislative genesis of section 167(k) is obscure. In 1968 Senator Javits intro-
duced S. 1199, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., a similar provision and perhaps a predecessor of Sec-
tion 167(k). The Javits bill is analyzed in TBE FEDERAL INco E TAx, supra note 2, at 81.
But in the Reform Act year the program appears to have originated with Rep. Mills'
committee.
14. An income standard of eligibility is assumed in this Note. Either an income stan-
dard or a rental standard could be used without doing violence to the statutory lan-
guage, but an income standard avoids the possibility of occupancy by high income fam-
ilies who choose to minimize their housing expenditures, though they are not compelled
to do so by limited means.
A rental standard might be simpler to administer and would avoid vexing difficulties
encountered under an income standard when a tenant's income rises to exceed the
permissible maximum under Section 167(k). In addition, a rental standard would
involve a less complete disclosure of financial affairs by the tenant, an attribute
of income standards which has disturbed some commentators, see, e.g., Handler & Rosen.
heilm, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice, 31 L. & Coer. ip. Pnon.
377-92 (1966); Note, Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data
Center, 82 HAv. L. Rlv. 400 (1968). Of course, if disclosure were made directly to the
Internal Revenue Service, or if the tenant's tax returns were used as a source of infor-
mation, no governmental probing into personal financial affairs would be added by an
income standard.
The characteristics of Section 167(k) examined in this Note are not dependent upon
the adoption of an income standard. There is a strong relationship between income and
ability to pay rent which justifies the conclusions made in this Note regardless of the kind
of standard. See generally, A DEcmr HoM 41-43. Difficulties stemming from regional
differences in monetary standard of living, which have plagued other housing programs,
are not considered here. See, e.g., Hearings on Housing and Urban Development Legis-
lation of 1969 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Sen. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 53-54 (Statement of Senator Javits indicating
failure of programs under the 1968 Housing Act in high cost areas); id. at 3-39 (statistics
showing marked predominance in southern regions of housing built under Sections 235
and 236 of the National Housing Act).
15. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 167(k)(3)(B).
16. See p. 970 and note 39 infra.
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even the smallest rehabilitation expenditure qualifying under the sec-
tion.17 At this level, participation would be economically impractical.
As the ceiling is moved higher, an increasing amount of tax revenue
will be lost as a consequence of a more widespread utilization of the
subsidy. Since resources for rehabilitation are not unlimited in the
short run,"' at high eligibility ceilings demand created by the subsidy
may cause inflationary price increases.
The maximum permissible level of tenant income under Section
167(k) will directly influence the apportionment of the subsidy among
different levels of society. The ceiling will not only deny benefits to
those whose incomes are higher than the maximum; it will also fail to
ensure that benefits will reach those whose incomes fall much below it.
For several reasons, one can predict a tendency for Section 167(k) pro-
jects to serve tenants whose incomes cluster just beneath the ceiling.,,
First, landlords will find it more attractive to use the allowance to
benefit tenants of higher income. Landlords believe that renting to
higher-income tenants reduces the real depreciation rate at which the
market value of property diminishes.20 Since the economic value of
17. For example, a $3,000 rehabilitation will require a significant increase fix monthly
rental. Taking as a general rule of thumb that rent equal to one per cent of capital value
is required monthly, and assuming that all tax benefits are passed on to the tenant, a
$3,000 expenditure will require $17.50 additional monthly rent if his landlord Is In the
25% tax bracket. If his landlord is in the 15 per cent bracket, $24.75 additional
rent will be required. This relationship is particularly important since dwellings occupied
by low income families are not often owned by wealthy landlords, see note 27 infra.
Some authorities contend that tenants in slum dwellings are adverse to rehabilitation
programs because rents may increase. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5 at 4906 (Statement of Charles Davenport),
18. See p. 968 infra.
19. The allocation process discussed here assumes rational decision-makers pursuing
a goal of after-tax profit maximization. For example, an individual landlord who owns
three properties is expected to rehabilitate first that property which will provide the
greatest return on his expenditure. Similarly, an investor contemplating a number of
rehabilitation prospects is expected to buy first the property offering the greatest poten-
tial return. As a result, in the aggregate of all properties eligible for rehabilitation un-
der Section 167(k), those promising the highest return will be rehabilitated first. The de-
cision-making process continues in an iterative manner until the return on a potential
rehabilitation is not sufficient to attract an investment. See generally H. Bleman P4 8,
Smidt, THE CAPITAL BUDGETNG DEcisIoN ch. 2. Real estate investors usually require a
15% after tax rate of return. A DECENT HOME 83.
There are two factors which could disrupt this model of the rehabilitation decision.
making process. First, there are a substantial number of small landlords who may be
unaware of more promising unfulfilled rehabilitation prospects than the one offered by
their properties, so that they simply make a sub-optimal decision to rehabilitate their
own properties. The significance of this market imperfection is reduced by the fact that
Section 167(k) may be used more often by wealthy landlords or investors than by the
small single property owner. See p. 968 infra. Second, the fact that the tax deduction is
more valuable to high bracket taxpayers could distort the decision-making process by
making the owner's tax bracket an influential factor. However, each individual high
bracket taxpayer views his alternatives assuming a constant marginal tax rate, so he will
choose the alternative promising the highest return. Therefore, in the aggregate, prop.
erties promising the highest return should be rehabilitated first.
20. This is the accepted view among real estate operators, although most published
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accelerated tax depreciation is measured by the difference between the
rate of depreciation allowed for tax purposes and the real rate,2 the
slower real depreciation of higher-income property increases tie value
of the tax incentive. Second, experience indicates that it will be
easier to obtain financing for projects aimed at the high end of the
permissible income range. Financing "home improvements" for
middle and upper income families has been a lucrative business for
banks and other mortgage lenders, 22 but rehabilitation financing for
low income families has been very difficult to find.2 Third, construction
techniques and architectural devices already familiar to contractors and
developers will be applicable to projects aimed at the high end of the
permissible income range, but far less applicable as the projected tenant
income declines.24 Fourth, properties cheap enough for rehabilitation
into units for rental to low income tenants may often be located in
statements make the point indirectly. See generally Stevens, The Many Methods Used in
Wise Residential Tenant Selection, 31 J. PRoP. M.mrr. 39 (1966); cf. C. Abrams, Tin Crr-
is THE FaoNnea 187-89 (1965); Klumb, Management Problems, 32 J. Puop. McmtT. 93
(1967); STmm wLm, THE T.Nm. mENT LANDLORD 73-75 (1966).
This view is supported by persuasive evidence at the extremes. For example, deteriora-
tion has sometimes been incredibly rapid in public housing projects. Within five years
of construction a public housing project in Springfield, Massachusetts, had reached a
stage of advanced deterioration. Hearings on Housing and Urban Development Legisla-
tion of 1969 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Sen. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21-24 (1969).
Since number of children, education, and income are each related to the probability
of tenant abuse (and, conversely, to the possibility of creating a "premium rent' build-
ing), it would be difficult to relate income alone to the actual rate of deterioration. For
a somewhat confused statement by landlords on this subject see SrmLmEt 73-75.
21. Taubman & Rasche, Economic and Tax Depreciation of Office Buildings, 22 NAT'L
TAx J. 334, 335.-36 (1969).
The differential in subsidy between middle-income and low-income units would be
doubly great if the latter were generally depreciated over shorter useful lives than the
former, since the contraction in allow-able useful life would be greater for middle-income
units. At least one authority maintains that low-income units are depredated over
shorter lives. Sporn, Some Contributions of the Income Tax Law to the Growth and
Prevalence of Slums, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 1026, 1037 (1959). Since "the estimated useful life
of an asset is not necessarily the useful life inherent in the asset but is tie period over
which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in his trade or
business ...determined by reference to his experience with similar property taking into
account present conditions and probable future developments," Treas. Reg. § 1.167(2)-l(b)
(1956), Sporn's view is probably correct, espedally for large landlords owning many low-
income buildings from which to derive depredation data. But even for landlords who
simply rely on generalized guidelines, see Rev. PRoc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cumr. BUL. 418, 419-20,
the subsidy is greater for buildings with a longer real useful life. See generally Taubman
& Rasche, supra.
If administrative considerations were set aside, a truly "neutral" fast depredation
scheme would appropriately adjust the useful life of rehabilitated property as a function
of the income level of tenants. As tenant income declined, useful life would also be al-
lowed to decline. The complexity of such adjustments makes them unsuitable for in-
corporation into tax subsidy expenditures, although expenditure programs can and do
make equivalent adjustments.
22. See, e.g., D. HAYms, BANK LENDING PoLcIEs 171-72 (196.1).
23. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 285-86; see also A DEcEr HoMrE 95-97.
24. See note 31 infra.
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deteriorating neighborhoods.2 5 Investors have been reluctant to attempt
rehabilitation in decaying urban areas, because of the fear that general
neighborhood deterioration will exert a depressing effect on rentals
and property values.26 Finally, the subsidy will be greater and hence
more attractive for units serving higher-income tenants to the extent
that owners of such units are more prosperous than those who rent to
lower income tenants2 7 because tax incentives become more valuable
as the income of the taxpayer increases. 2 1
Few would object to adopting a relatively high eligibility level"0 if
all families and individuals with incomes below that maximum could
be expected to benefit. But were one to establish a high ceiling-per-
haps at or near the median income level-there is every reason to be-
lieve that many most in need of housing would go unassisted. Millions
of families and individuals are to be found at incomes slightly below
the median.30 Section 167(k) projects would focus first on them, ab-
sorbing all the capital available for rehabilitation. 1
25. See generally B. Freiden, Tin FuTuRE oF OLD NEIGHBORIOODS 73-103 (19M1).
26. See generally A DECENT HoME 104-05; McFarland, Residential Rehabilitation Es.
says in URBAN LAND EcoNoMnEs 127-28 (L. Grebler ed. 1966); Quirk, Wein & Gomberg,
A Draft Program of Housing Reform-The Tenant Condominium, 53 CORNmL L. Rtv.
361, 372 (1968).
Apparently the Treasury is aware of these problems. In a letter describing the back.
ground of Section 167(k) the Assistant Secretary's office indicated that the program was
designed "to prevent continued decay and abandonment of older problems in urban
areas." Letter from John S. Nolan, Deputy Assistant Secretary o the Treasury, to the
author, on file in the offices of the Yale Law Journal. For a good description of the
abandonment problem see NEwSWEEK, Jan. 12, 1970, at 86.
27. Sternleib's study of Newark's slum areas indicates that a substantial proportion
of slum properties are owned by local small owners with less than three properties.
S=mrum, Exhibit 6-1, at 123. Comparative data on ownership of middle Income rental
properties would be helpful.
28. For a good presentation of the relationship between income and subsidy under
Section 167(k) see Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 5, at 4906 (Statement of Charles Davenport).
29. One such standard would be the income limitations established for Section
221(d)(3). See note 38 infra.
30. In 1967 there were approximately 48.9 million families in the United States,
Roughly one-quarter of all families (24.3%) fell in the income group from $7,000.9,999
which contains the median; about one-sixth (16.1%) fell in the group from $5,000.6,999
immediately below the median. STATIsTIcAL ABSTRAcT OF TnE UNITED STATes 323 (1969).
The statistics for unrelated individuals show a similar distribution. More recent statistlc
for "households" (i.e., families and individuals aggregated) can be found in U.S. Bureau
of the Census, Current Population Reports: Consumer Income, Series P-60 (annual).
31. Not only is the total amount of manpower and resources available for construc.
tion limited, but rehabilitation is even more severely limited than other aspects of the
construction industry:
To carry out housing rehabilitation successfully requires a specialist and, because of
the special and varied implications of the job, a professional of that type is, at the
present time, still a rather rare species. . .. It may be safely assumed that, at the
present time, 9 out of 10 contractors are not qualified or willing to [undertake a re-
habilitation project].
Hearings on S. 1354 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 282, 285 (1965) (Statement by the General Improve.
ment Contractors Association).
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The income ceiling, finally, will affect the nature of the rehabilitation
which is undertaken. As noted above, landlords will be forced to limit
their expenditures, after the cost reduction which the tax incentive
will permit, to those that tenants will be able to afford. Although it
may be that substantive checks will be imposed on the kinds of expendi-
tures sanctioned by the section,32 the Treasury could, for administrative
convenience, construe the section as applying to any capital expendi-
tures between $3,000 and $15,000 over two consecutive years, reviewing
only the incomes of the tenants. Since rental units occupied by higher
income families are already endowed with the standard amenities,
it is likely that their rehabilitation would involve the addition of luxury
items. If the program were to reach the median family income, it might
serve to subsidize the installation of all-electric heat in dwellings never
noted for their lack of adequate heat, or the addition of third bathrooms
to units already graced with two.
The method which Section 167(k) provides for establishing the ceil-
ing on tenant income should be employed with these considerations
in mind. The section directs the Secretary of the Treasury to determine
eligibility "in a manner consistent with the policies of the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968."' ' The 1968 Housing Act was an
omnibus bill which created several new direct expenditure programs
and which also made important changes in then-existing government
housing assistance programs.34 There are many difficulties in determin-
ing eligibility levels for Section 167(k) by referring to the policies of a
prior omnibus statute providing another form of subsidy administered
by a different executive department. The only express policy of the
1968 Housing Act is a reiteration of Congress's intent to keep its sights
on a distant star--"a decent home and suitable living environment for
every American family."35 From this evidence, low and moderate in-
come tenants could be defined as those who do not enjoy incomes suf-
ficient to provide decent housing, whatever that worn standard means.
If Congress intended for the Secretary of the Treasury to look only to
express statements of policy in the 1968 Housing Act, it might simply
have instructed the Secretary to apply Section 167(k) to families whose
incomes are not sufficient to provide "decent" housing. In the absence
of such instruction, the Secretary should seek more guidance from the
policies implicit in the housing assistance programs created by the Act.
32. See p. 964 supra.
33. iNT. RE'v. CODE OF 1954, § 167(k)(3)(B).
34. Pub. L. No. 94-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968).
35. Id. § 2.
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A closer examination of the 1968 Housing Act can indeed sfiarpen
the standard by which Section 167(k) should be governed. That Act
created three new housing programs. Two of them were the widely-
heralded Section 235 home-ownership programm and the Section 236
rental housing program.37 Both have roughly the same eligibility
standards: they are designed to assist families whose incomes fall be-
tween the level traditionally eligible for admission to public housing
and the minimum income served by Section 221(d)(3). 8s Sections 235
and 236 are manifestations of a new congressional emphasis on serving
families with incomes lower than those of families previously assisted
under low and moderate income programs.3° Consistent with this view
is the statement of the House Committee on Banking and Currency
that Sections 235 and 236 "are to be administered so as to accord a
preference to those families whose incomes are within the lowest
practicable limits ... under [these] section[s]." 40 While a finding that
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1715Z (Supp. IV 1969).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1715Z-1 (Supp. IV 1969). For a description of the Section 235 and 230
programs see Quirk & Wein, Homeownership for the Poor: Tenant Condominiums, ihi
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, and the Rockefeller Program, 54 Co auLa.
L. REv. 811, 820-32 (1969).
38. Housing Act of 1961 § 101(a)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3) (1964). For a description
of the Section 221(d)(3) program see Note, Government Housing Assistance to the Poor,
76 YALE L.J. 508 (1967). Section 221(d)(3) cannot reach as far down the income scale as
Sections 235 and 286 because the latter programs reduce interest rates for assisted fain.
ilies to a minimum of one per cent, whereas the former reduces rates only to three pet'
cent. Originally the Section 25 and 286 programs may have been seen as an extension
or modification of Section 221(d)(3), to reach families with less income than those reached
by 221(d)(3). Cf. President's Message to Congress on Housing and Urban Problems, 114
CONG. REc. 4041 (1968) (message proposing the new programs). But Congress visualized
the new programs as separate ones with an impact on families between the incomes el-
igibIe for 221(d)(8) and public housing:
Eligibility to participate . . . is limited to families whose incomes do not exceed 135
per cent of the incomes set for admission to low-rent public housing in the area,
except that 20 per cent of the funds . . . may be used for families with higher In.
comes which do not exceed 90 per cent of the limits for 221(d)(3) below market in.
terest rate housing. A deduction of $300 per child is permitted in determining fain.
ily income.
HOUSE Comrar. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 90TH CONG., 2D SEss,, SUMSARY OF Tai HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT Aar OF 1968, at 1.
The formula used for computing income limits for admission to Section 221(d)(3) BMIR
projects is detailed in Hearings on H.R. 5810 and Related Bills Be/ore the Subcomm, on
Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Ses., 200
(1965).
39. The third new program, authorizing National Housing Partnerships to attract
business investment into housing for low and moderate income families, expresses no
new congressional intent regarding what income levels should receive federal housing
assistance. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 § 902(a), 42 U.S.C, § ,932(a)
(Supp. IV 1969). The principal attraction is a provision of the section which assures
flow through of depreciation to corporate partners. See Quirk & Wein, supra note 37,
at 845-46.
40. COsM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, HOUSE OF REP., 90T CONG., COMPILATION Ot
THE HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AC OF 1968, SEanION-BY-SE'rbON SUM1MARy 162,
169 (1968).
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Congress favored helping those families with the lowest incomes which
could be reached by each program is not compelled, the inference is
reasonable in light of the greater need of the poor,41 and is supported
by legislative materials.42
Interpreted in this fashion, the section's reference to the policies of
the 1968 Housing Act creates a clearly defined standard with two parts.
The income ceiling of families and individuals eligible under Section
167(k) should fall somewhere between the lowest incomes of families
which can utilize Sections 235 and 236 and the maximum levels under
Section 221(d)(3). This vast range reaches down almost to the level of
income served by public housing and up into the area of median family
income. The character of the Section 167(k) program will depend
substantially on where within this range the income ceiling is placed.43
The second part of the standard derived from the 1968 Housing Act
requires that the program help families of the lowest income practicable.
Since rehabilitation efforts will cluster close to the eligibility maximum,
one question must be asked: How far beneath the maximum ceiling
can the eligibility limit be set without significantly reducing the num-
ber of units that will be rehabilitated? Though the answer to this
question is not obvious, the Treasury should, with the help of expert
advice or careful econometric analysis,4 4 be able to answer it. A proper
implementation of Section 167(k) requires that the effort be made.
The merits of tax incentives as devices for encouraging housing
production have been questioned. Commentators have pointed out that
tax incentives create tax inequities,45 that they are a form of subsidy
offering wealthy individuals opportunities not open to others,40 and that
they are less efficient and less visible than direct expenditures. 47 Passage
of Section 167(k) raises still other issues: what result did Congress
41. See, e.g., A DEcENT HoM E, Table 1-8, at 44; see also U.S. Dept. of Housing and
Urban Development, 1967 STATISCAL YEAXnooK 42; U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News Serv.,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3038 (1968) (more recent but less precise data).
42. As the income of eligible families is allowed to rise, the expenditure necessary
to bring their dwellings to a "decent," level decreases. Hence, more families might be
assisted if the income eligibility ceiling were high. See Note, Government Housing As-
sistance to the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 508, 537 (1967). With respect to Section 167(k), however,
Congress appears to have chosen to help a lesser number of families with larger subsidies.
43. See p. 965 supra.
44. See, e.g., Tax Reform Studies and Proposals: U.S. Treasury Department. Part 4
(1969), a technical study of the economic effect of percentage depletion allowances, pre-
pared by CONSAD Research Corp.
45. Tim FEDERAL INco.m TAx 5-8; Hearings, supra note 41, at 4903-0S; Surrey, Tax
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct
Expendtiures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705, 720 (1970); Note, Government Programs to Encour-
age Private Investment in Low-Income Housing, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1295, 1296-99 (196S).
46. See p. 968 and note 28 supra.
47. THE FEDERA. INcom TAx 81-84; Tax Reform Studies, note 44 supra, at 2.2.
971
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 79: 961, 1970
intend, and how can the incentive be administered to achieve that
result? If Congress intended to aid low income groups primarily, this
goal can best be served by establishing the lowest ceiling consistent
with full utilization of the program.
Advocates of tax incentives argue that because tax incentives leave
much to the operation of market forces, they are better able to redirect
the strength of a private economy than are other subsidies.48 Yet while
keeping the tax incentive unfettered by detailed provisions may harness
the strength of private enterprise, it may also direct government largess
to unintended recipients or encourage less needed economic activity.4
To design an effective tax incentive, whether at the legislative or admin-
istrative level, the interaction between the subsidy and the numerous
uncontrolled market forces affecting its utilization must be understood
fully. Section 167(k) will miss the mark if, in setting the ceiling on
eligible tenant incomes, the forces which could divert it from its in-
tended effect are not taken into account.
48. To bring the resources of private enterprise to bear on the problems of the
slums, it will be necessary to provide a system of incentives and assistance. . . . For
it is not out of lack of a sense of responsibility, nor out of disinterest or ignorance,
that American business has neglected the city housing problem ....
But as David Rockefeller also told the committee, businessmen know of no real
way 'in which private enterprise can build and make a profit, even a modest one,' In
the building for the lower income families. In the words of a Ford Foundation po-
sition paper:
'If private capital is to enter (the slums), new and powerful incentives will be
needed to compensate for the obvious economic disadvantages that now exist.'
And, the paper continues:
'Next to an outright guarantee of profits-an undesirable and unlikely alternative-
the most effective tools we have so far devised to redirect the flow of private re-
sources are private tax incentives.'
113 CONG. Rzc. 18823-24 (July 13, 1967) (Remarks of Sen. Robert Kennedy on introducing
S.2100, his tax incentive program for encouraging business investment in urban poverty
area housing).
Not all commentators have reached the same conclusion as Senator Kennedy. See, e.g.,
THE FEDEMlAL INcomE TAX, supra note 2, at 97; Surrey, supra note 45.
49. See, e.g., Tax Reform Studies, supra note 44, at 26-27.
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